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The Use of Restrictive Agreements in
Estate Tax Valuation of Farmlands
and Other Properties
By DON R. CASTLEMAN*
I. INTRODUCTION
There has been much discussion in recent years concerning
the impact of inflation on estate and property tax valuation of
farmlands. Because the quantity of land is limited, its value
depends not only on its use but also on its potential use. A farm
containing 600 acres, for example, may produce an income to
its owner of $50,000 per year. Adjusting this figure for the value
of the farmer's labor and attributing one-half of the income to
the land and using a moderate capitalization rate of 8 percent,
the land would have a "productive" value of $320,000. How-
ever, if the land is valued at its fair market value, i.e. the price
for which the land could be sold in a market where residential,
industrial, and commercial developers are bidding against the
agricultural interests, the land might have a value of $600,000
to $2 million.
An example of such disparity in valuation occurred re-
cently in Shelby County, Tennessee, when the county tax as-
sessor reassessed all agricultural land in the county on the basis
of the most recent sale prices of real estate. High density resi-
dential and commercial development had driven land prices as
high as $20,000 per acre in some cases, and $2,500 to $3,000 per
acre was considered a reasonable bargain. The result was that
the property taxes on an acre of farm land might exceed the
average income per acre from farming in some cases. Fortun-
ately, legislation was hurriedly passed requiring valuation
based on the use to which the property was devoted.
Although various proposals are pending before Congress,
no such relief has yet been afforded in the area of federal estate
taxes. The purpose of this article is to explore the use of restric-
tive agreements, purchase options, and rights of first refusal,
* Associate Professor of Law, Drake University. B.A. 1967, Lambuth College; J.D.
1967, University of Tennessee.
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all commonly called "buy-sell" agreements, to limit the estate
tax valuation of real estate. Since such agreements have gener-
ally been used only by closely held corporations, the significant
case law and primary regulatory activity have involved closely
held securities. But "buy-sell" agreements have also been used
to value partnership interests, and there is precedent for their
application to real estate apart from its inclusion in a corpora-
tion or partnership sale.' Furthermore, it is logical that the
underlying legal principles should apply regardless of the spe-
cific nature of the property involved.
Actually, the concept of using a buy-sell agreement, as
discussed in this article, comes not as a separate approach to
a problem, but rather as a logical extension of the prevailing
methodology with regard to estate planning for persons pos-
sessing large capital inventories, particularly real estate. A
farmer owning even modest acreage will quickly realize that
liquidity will be a significant problem for his estate. Despite
the authorization for paying federal estate taxes over a 10 year
period under some circumstances,2 a prudent estate planner
will invariably suggest that the farmer purchase substantial
amounts of life insurance on his own life to provide the needed
liquidity for the estate upon his death. To avoid inclusion of
the life insurance proceeds in the estate and the resultant mag-
nification of the estate tax problem, 3 the competent planner
will seek to have someone other than the executor or estate of
the insured named as beneficiary and to have all incidents of
ownership transferred to someone other than the insured. Fre-
quently the named beneficiary and the owner of the policy will
be the person to whom the farm is to pass upon death of the
insured. The mechanics of planning are not regimented, but
usually amount to an exchange between the executor and the
survivor whereby the executor gets the insurance proceeds with
which the tax is paid, and the survivor gets the farm. In the
cases of insurance-funded corporate or partnership buy-sell
agreements, the identical exchange, substitution of cash for
estate assets, takes place. The important added feature in the
I Estate of Francis J. Moors, No. 99866 (B.T.A., Oct. 22, 1946); P-H B.T.A. DEC.
No. 46,520, infra note 49.
1 INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 6166 [hereinafter cited as I.R.C.].
Id. § 2042.
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case of a properly drawn buy-sell agreement or purchase option
is that the price to be paid for the asset can be fixed in the
agreement and thereby influence the valuation for estate tax
assessment.
This is not to say that the parties to the agreement can,
by their own bargain, fix the value and bind the government
to that determination for estate tax imposition,4 but the agree-
ment is a factor to be considered in arriving at the value.' Given
full weight, the practical effect of the agreement will be to fix
the value.' The rationale of this theory rests on the basic rule
of section 2031(a), which requires that the gross estate shall
include "the value at the time of his death of all property
..* . ." "Value" is defined by the treasury regulations as "fair
market value . . . the price at which the property would
change hands between a willing buyer and a willing seller,
neither being under any compulsion to buy or to sell and both
having reasonable knowledge of relevant facts."' If property is
subject to a valid and enforceable option or agreement with a
fixed price, a willing buyer would certainly not pay more than
the optionee if the property was subject to an exercise by the
optionee that would require the buyer to surrender the property
at a lower price.
Obviously, the predetermination of price under the agree-
ment, and hence the property value for estate tax purposes,
only benefits the estate if the option price is less than the value
which would otherwise be assigned to the property. The signifi-
cance of this ability to pre-establish value is that the parties
to the agreement can determine the criteria upon which they
will base their valuation, productive value rather than inflated
relative values for example, and the parties can impede, if not
eliminate, further inflation of the established value.
II. PREDETERMINATION OF ESTATE VALUATION
An examination of the pertinent cases reveals the implica-
Frederick A. Koch, Jr., 28 B.T.A. 363 (1933).
Treas. Reg. § 20.2031-1 et seq. (1965).
8 Ness, Federal Estate Tax Consequences of Agreements and Options to Purchase
Stock upon Death, 49 CoLUM. L. REv. 796 (1949).
7 I.R.C. § 2031(a).
8 Treas. Reg. § 20.2031-1(b) (1965).
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tions of this theory, sometimes with startling results. In Wilson
v. Bowers9 for example, the decedent, Arthur Wilson, died own-
ing 3,000 shares of Earl & Wilson Co. common stock. The dece-
dent had agreed by contract with his nephew Franklin and one
Betts, who together with the decedent were the owners of all
the outstanding company stock, that he would not sell or assign
his shares without first offering them to his nephew, Franklin.
The contract further provided that in the event of Wilson's
death, Franklin would have an option for a period of 4 months
following the appointment of an executor to purchase the stock
from Wilson's estate at $6.66 2/3 per share, and in the event
Franklin failed to exercise the option, a similar right was given
to Betts. Reciprocal rights of first refusal and options to pur-
chase granted by the other parties to Wilson furnished consid-
eration for his promises.
Wilson died, leaving the stock to Franklin by will. The
executor of his estate valued the shares of stock in the estate
tax return at $20,000 or $6.66 2/3 per share, but the Commis-
sioner of Internal Revenue increased the valuation to $23.55 per
share. The court sustained the executor's valuation based on
the contract price, however, noting that the validity and en-
forceability of the contract was not disputed; that the shares
could not have been sold during Wilson's life, nor by his execu-
tor for more than the low price agreed upon in the contract,
unless both Franklin and Betts agreed to forego their rights;
and that the options would almost certainly have been exer-
cised.
Even if each was penniless, money could readily have been
borrowed on the stock when it was worth nearly four times
the option price .... the possibility that the options would
not be exercised seems too extravagant to require further re-
futation.10
The court concluded that even though Franklin did not exer-
cise his option but rather took the shares as legatee under the
will, this did not negate the effect of the existence of the option
at the time of Wilson's death: "Logically, subsequent events
57 F.2d 682 (2d Cir. 1932).
0 Id. at 684.
[Vol. 64
ESTATE TAX VALUATION OF FARMLANDS
should not be considered in determining value at the time of
death." 1
The United States Supreme Court has never passed on the
effect of buy-sell agreements and options on valuation for es-
tate-tax purposes, but in Helvering v. Salvage1 2 the Court held
that where an employee received, as compensation, stock sub-
ject to a repurchase option, the amount of income attributable
to the employee could not exceed the option price of $100 per
share even though the unencumbered value of the stock was
$1,164.70. In affirming the decision of the Second Circuit,"3 the
Supreme Court said "Considering the option to repurchase at
par, outstanding in 1922, there could be no proper finding of
fair market value at that time in excess of $100 per share."'4
Subsequently, the Second Circuit applied Salvage in
Lomb v. Sugden.15 The stockholders of the Bausch & Lomb
Optical Co. had given the other stockholders rights of first
refusal on the sale of stock at a price to be computed by a
formula set forth in the agreement. The right of first refusal
also partially attached upon the death of a shareholder to the
following extent: the deceased shareholder could leave any por-
tion of his stock to his issue or another shareholder, but could
not bequeath more than 10 percent of his holdings to any other
party without first offering the stock to the surviving share-
holders at the agreed price. Mrs. Carrie B. Lomb, a party to
the agreement, died owning 1,500 shares of Bausch & Lomb
stock valued by the option agreement at $69.445 per share. The
Commissioner, however, determined a per share value of $100.
Judge Augustus Hand observed:
The decision of the Supreme Court on January 13, 1936,
in Helvering v. Salvage, 56 S.Ct. 375, 377, 80 L.Ed. [511],
recognizes an option agreement as restricting the market
value of stock in the hands of the owner to the option price.
There Justice McReynolds said: "Considering the option to
repurchase at par, outstanding in 1922, there could be no
proper finding of fair market value at that time in excess of
11 Id.
12 297 U.S. 106 (1936).
,3 Salvage v. Commissioner, 76 F.2d 112 (2d Cir. 1935).
,1 297 U.S. at 109.
Is 82 F.2d 166 (2d Cir. 1936).
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$100 per share." Because of the agreement, the decedent
could not have secured a price greater than $69.455 at the
time of her death. It is as of that time that the value of the
stock must be determined. Then she could only give it or sell
it to the other stockholders at the price fixed. Its value to the
estate can be no greater than that with which the decedent
parted. Edwards v. Slocum, 264 U.S. 61, 63, 44 S.Ct. 293, 68
L.Ed. 564.'1
After Lomb v. Sugden, however, the issue became less
clear. The Tax Court in Estate of Pearl Gibbons Reynolds'
7
modified the strength of the Second Circuit rule. It recognized
Salvage as support for the rule of these cases that "first offer
restrictions on the sale of securities are the sole index of the
securities' fair market value, at least where the restrictions are
enforceable both at death and during the security holder's life-
time,"'" but in limiting that rule declared:
However, early rulings by the Board of Tax Appeals (a
predecessor to this court) and later rulings by various tribun-
als which have attempted to distinguish Wilson and Lomb
make it clear that the existence of first offer provisions is
usually no more than a relevant factor to be considered with
all other factors in determining fair market value.'"
In support of its modified rule, the court cited cases from the
Third, Fifth and Eighth Circuits.
In the Third Circuit case, Kline v. Commissioner,20 the
taxpayer owned stock subject to a restriction on transfer and
an option exercisable only upon his death or termination of
employment. If the taxpayer died or terminated his employ-
ment under "acceptable conditions" the option price was 75
percent of book value; if the employment was terminated by
, Id. at 168. Application of income tax valuation cases to estate and gift tax
valuation has been criticized in Note, 60 HARv. L. REv. 123, 131 (1946), and such
criticism is understandable. See Commissioner v. Wemyss, 324 U.S. 303 (1945), and
United States v. Davis, 370 U.S. 65 (1962), in which the Court held that although a
transaction may be considered a gift for gift tax assessment, it does not have to be
considered a gift when assessing income tax. The principle of these cases, however,
should not control the valuation problem at issue here.
,1 55 T.C. 172 (Oct. 29, 1970).
" Id. at 188, 189.
Id. at 189.
44 B.T.A. 1052, aff'd., 130 F.2d 742 (3d Cir. 1942).
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the taxpayer under "unacceptable" conditions, the option
price was 66 2/3 percent of book value; and if the company
fired him for cause, the option price was 33 2/3 percent of book
value. Taxpayer made a gift of stock and valued the shares for
gift tax purposes at the lowest price he might be guaranteed
under the agreement. The court noted the "small chance" that
he would have his employment terminated in such a way as to
subject him to the low value prescribed and said that "earning
power of a stock is entitled to great consideration in determin-
ing value."'"
The Fifth Circuit, in Krauss v. United States,22 did not
reject Lomb, but distinguished it on its facts. In Krauss, like
Kline, a gift tax case, the court noted that the restriction,
contained in the charter of the issuing corporation, was only a
right of first refusal incident to any intended sale of stock by
the shareholders. The charter imposed no compulsion to sell,
granted no absolute option to buy, and was therefore only a
factor in arriving at the value of the stock for gift tax purposes,
not its sole determinant. But the court agreed with the conten-
tion of the United States that the real holding in Lomb was
that such a right of first refusal would fix the value for estate
tax purposes.
This is precisely correct, and the Second Circuit itself has
distinguished Wilson and Lomb with regard to gift tax applica-
tion, in Commissioner v. McCann.23 The stock in that case was
subject to a bylaw provision requiring the employee to sell the
stock at book value, requiring the company to purchase the
stock in the event of termination of employment or death, and
prohibiting transfer to a nonemployee.
In holding that the Tax Court erred in refusing to consider
evidence other than the option price, the court said: "The fact
that the price at the shareholder's retirement or death was
fixed for both parties, did not prevent the shareholder from
collecting any dividends declared before that time .... ,,2,
The court thus agreed with the Third Circuit that retention
21 Id. at 745.
140 F.2d 510 (5th Cir. 1944).
146 F.2d 385 (2d Cir. 1944).
2, Id. at 386.
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value as well as sale value must be considered in gift tax cases,
and adopted the reasoning of Kline and Krauss:
Nobody could know when the donor would retire or die;
meanwhile, he would be entitled to such dividends as were
declared; and when he did retire or die, the book value of the
shares would not be likely to bear much relation to what it
was at the time of the gift.?
Retention value, however, does not have to be considered
in estate tax cases, as the court demonstrated by distinguishing
Wilson and Lomb, since in those cases the power to retain has
terminated and retention value has thereby been eliminated.
This distinction was expressed directly in Spitzer v.
Commissioner,26 a case dealing with the problem of gift tax
valuation of stock subject to a restrictive shareholder's agree-
ment. The Court distinguished Wilson, Lomb, and Salvage:
Plainly, all these cases are distinguishable from the facts
in the present case. In the income tax case the value of the
shares and the critical time for the determination of value
were fixed by the option contract. In each of the estate tax
cases the critical event, the death of the holder of the shares,
which subjected the stock to purchase for a price stated in the
option, had occurred. In the circumstances of these cases it
was plain that a purchaser could not be found for the shares
at a greater price than that for which he would be compelled
to sell immediately upon acquisition. In the present case peti-
tioner at the time of the gift was 51 years of age, with a life
expectancy of twenty years. When the gift was made no one
could predict when petitioner might die, or retire without the
consent of the other executive stockholders. The critical
event necessary to occur in order to bring into play the provi-
sions of the contract fixing the price of the stock given by
petitioner to his wife had not occurred; and, by its terms, the
contract might have been terminated long before the occurr-
ence of the critical event."
In the First Circuit, an estate valuation case appearing to
be contrary to the Second Circuit rule, is distinguishable on its
facts. In Worcester County Trust Co. v. Commissioner,28 James
n Id.
2' 153 F.2d 967 (8th Cir. 1946).
Id. at 970.
134 F.2d 578 (1st Cir. 1943).
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Smith died owning 12,760 shares of stock in Southwell Wool
Lombing Company the articles of incorporation of which re-
quired any shareholder or the executor or administrator of
any decreased shareholder, before transferring any shares
for value or by gift or otherwise, to offer the shares to the
company for book value for 30 days. Furthermore, the articles
provided that the restriction would not apply to a testamen-
tary or intestate distribution to legatees or next of kin. De-
clining to follow the Second Circuit's Wilson and Lomb cases,
the court held that the restriction did not fix the value for
estate tax purposes but was merely a factor.
Although the First Circuit did not refer to Wilson and
Lomb directly, those cases are clearly distinguishable on their
facts, since, in Worcester County, the restriction applied only
to lifetime sales, and not to testamentary disposition. Thus,
Wilson and Lomb may still be persuasive in the First Circuit,
after Collins v. Commissioner,29 which followed Worcester
County. Although refusing to follow Wilson, and Lomb, and
Salvage, the Collins court kept them alive in the First Circuit
by distinguishing them expressly: "We do not disagree with the
results of the aforementioned three cases, but merely hold that
the Series G bonds owned by decedent are of a nature different
from that of the stock and option rights involved in those
cases." 3
0
The Seventh Circuit appears to follow the Second Circuit
position, although it declined to do so in Armstrong's Estate v.
Commissioner1 because the argument had not been raised in
the Tax Court.3 2 In disposing of the argument, however, the
Court telegraphed a future adoption of the Second Circuit rule:
"Had petitioner advanced the theory before the Tax Court,
that the value of the stock was reduced by this restriction on
its transfer by Goldsmith and his heirs and assigns, the Tax
Court might well have considered it."31
Given a chance to reaffirm its earlier position, the Second
Circuit did so in May v. McGowan34 in 1952, even though the
216 F.2d 519 (1st Cir. 1954).
' Id. at 521.
31 146 F.2d 457 (7th Cir. 1944).
2 In the Tax Court, the pivotal issue was includibility, not valuation.
3 146 F.2d at 460.
194 F.2d 396 (2d Cir. 1952).
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result was to value property at zero for estate tax assessment.
In doing so, it gave effect to an agreement between a father and
son, equal partners in business, and each owning 500 of the
1,000 outstanding shares of stock, that during their joint lives
neither would dispose of shares without extending a right of
first refusal to the other partner for $100 per share. The agree-
ment also provided, however, because the son had personally
guaranteed loans to the corporation of $164,409.86, that the
option price for each share purchased by the son would be
reduced by 1/500 of the indebtedness upon the date of the
exercise of the option. The agreement was also operative by the
same terms upon the death of either partner.
At the time of father's death, the indebtedness of the cor-
poration, personally guaranteed by the son, amounted to
$90,707.50. Thus, the formula set the son's option price at $100
- (90,707.50 - 500) = 0, and the executor included the 500
shares owned by the father in the estate at a value of zero.
There was apparently no attempt by the Commissioner to dis-
regard the agreement totally and value the stock at fair market
value by the conventional asset/earnings/comparative sales
method. Rather, he accepted the $100 per share value stated
in the buy-sell agreement, but disallowed any diminution as a
result of the corporate indebtedness.
The court again cited Salvage and Lomb as authority for
its position: "It seems clear that with the option outstanding
no one would purchase the stock of the decedent at its value
unrestricted by the option when it was subject to call by Harry
A. May at zero."3
Some earlier decisions36 had considered the transfer by the
decedent (the granting of the option or right of first refusal) as
taking effect in possession or enjoyment upon his death and
therefore includible in his estate as a transfer in contemplation
of death.3 1 It was argued in those cases that to the extent of the
"bargain," i.e. the difference between normal fair market value
at time of death and the stated contract price to be paid to
decedent's estate for the property, the decedent had made a
" Id. at 397.
31 Worcester County Trust Co. v. Commissioner, 134 F.2d 578 (1st Cir. 1943);
Commissioner v. Bensel, 100 F.2d 639 (3d Cir. 1938), aff'g 36 B.T.A. 246 (1937).
3 INT. REV. CODE OF 1939, § 811(c) (now I.R.C. § 2035, 2036, 2037).
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transfer that did not become effective until his death.
The Tenth Circuit, in its major contribution to the subject,
disposed of the "includible transfer" theory in Broderick v.
Gore.3 1 There the deceased had owned an interest in a partner-
ship, and the partnership agreement provided that, in the
event of withdrawal of a partner, the other partners would have
an option to purchase the withdrawing partner's interest at
book value, and in the event of the death of a partner, then the
estate of the deceased partner would be obligated to sell, and
the surviving partners would be obligated to purchase, the de-
ceased partner's interest for book value. The father, Harry
Gore, died leaving his interest to his copartners by will. The co-
partners, his sons, were also residuary beneficiaries and co-
executors. Rather than take the father's interest under the will,
the sons filed a petition in the probate court to compel them-
selves, as executors, to perform as required by the partnership
agreement and to sell the interest to themselves as individuals.
After a hearing in which the estate was represented by a court
appointed special administrator, the probate court found that
the agreement was specifically enforceable, that the book value
of the decedent's interest was $345,897.53, and ordered the sale.
The estate tax return for Gore's estate reported the partnership
interest at book value in reliance on the finding of the probate
court, but the Commissioner valued the interest at $516,457.84
and assessed additional estate tax. The Tenth Circuit, how-
ever, citing Wilson, Lomb and Salvage, held that the restric-
tion contained in the partnership agreement was determinative
of the value for estate tax purposes.
Finally, the Tax Court in Claire Giannini Hoffman 9 con-
sidered whether an agreement controlling transfer upon death,
but not inter vivos disposition, can escape revaluation by the
Commission on the same terms as those indicated in the forego-
ing discussion." In Hoffman the taxpayer had extended to his
brother an option exercisable upon the taxpayer's death to pur-
- 224 F.2d 892 (10th Cir. 1955).
3' 2 T.C. 1160 (1943); aff'd on other issues, 148 F.2d 285 (9th Cir. 1945).
40 The First Circuit, in Worcester County Trust Co. v. Commissioner, 134 F.2d 578
(lst Cir. 1943), had held that the converse, a mere lifetime restriction, does not escape
revaluation because the agreement becomes inoperative and allows greater value upon
the death of the owner.
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chase his interest in a partnership at a price far below its fair
market value. The Tax Court held the agreement to be a gra-
tuitous promise, unsupported by adequate consideration, and
made solely to benefit a favored individual, the natural object
of the promisor's bounty. It further held that no lifetime re-
striction limited the value of the interest or restricted its trans-
ferability, and refused to allow the agreement to establish val-
uation.
The current treasury regulations adopt the Hoffman rule,
refusing to give conclusive effect to options exercisable upon
death alone, or those not "bona-fide business arrange-
ment[s]" but designed merely to avoid estate tax.4 A careful
reading of the regulation, however, suggests that it does not
prevent the transfer by option to a business associate who is
also a relative of the transferee. It simply makes family status
a factor in determining whether the transfer is supported by
adequate consideration.2
III. CONCLUSION
The accumulated case law and current regulations suggest
that the following rules will govern transfers by buy-sell agree-
ments:
1. In order for a restrictive agreement to be considered in
determining valuation of the restricted assets in an estate,
" Trees. Reg. § 20.2031-2(h) (1974):
Another person may hold an option or a contract to purchase securities
owned by a decedent at the time of his death. The effect, if any, that is given
to the option or contract price in determining the value of the securities for
estate tax purposes depends upon the circumstances of the particular case.
Little weight will be accorded a price contained in an option or contract
under which the decedent is free to dispose of the underlying securities at
any price he chooses during his lifetime. Such is the effect, for example, of
an agreement on the part of a shareholder to purchase whatever shares of
stock the decedent may own at the time of his death. Even if the decedent
is not free to dispose of the underlying securities at other than the option or
contract price, such price will be disregarded in determining the value of the
securities unless it is determined under the circumstances of the particular
case that the agreement represents a bona fide business arrangement and not
a device to pass the decedent's shares to the natural objects of his bounty
for less than an adequate and full consideration in money or money's worth.
"2 Note that every major case, especially May v. McGowan, 194 F.2d 396 (2d Cir.
1952), has involved an intra-family agreement. Thus, such agreements can constitute
"bona-fide agreement[s]" under the regulation.
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the agreement must meet the following conditions:
(a) It must limit the ability of the owner to transfer the
assets during his lifetime for any price in excess of the price
stated in the agreement. This requirement would appear to
be met by the use of a mere right of first refusal."
(b) It must represent a bona fide business agreement
and not merely a device to pass the property to the natural
objects of the owner's bounty." The identity of the parties
to the agreement will bear on the issue of bona fides but
would not appear to preclude intra-family arrangements so
long as there is a bona fide business purpose such as the
preservation of family ownership or to induce future genera-
tions to remain with the family business. 5
(c) It must be supported by adequate and full consider-
ation. Normally, mutual covenants will provide adequate
consideration where the parties are all owners of an equity
interest in the assets. Where one of the parties does not pres-
ently have an equity interest, something more is necessary."
The significant factor is that the adequacy of consideration
is tested by the value of the underlying assets on the date the
agreement is made or the option is granted, rather than the
value at the date of death. Consequently, if the price stated
in the agreement is a fair price at the time of the agreement,
based upon the current value of the assets, value at the time
of death will not matter.
7
2. Assuming the requirements of the regulation are met, so
the agreement price is considered, the critical decision then
is whether the stated price is to be determinative or merely a
factor in arriving at value for estate tax purposes. The writer
submits that Wilson and Lomb remain viable and that for
purposes of estate tax valuation, the option price is determi-
native.
In applying the principles of the foregoing discussion to
assets other than securities, the regulations provide a clear
"1 May v. McGowan, 194 F.2d 396 (2d Cir. 1952); Lomb v. Sugden, 82 F.2d 166
(2d Cir. 1936); Wilson v. Bowers, 37 F.2d 682 (2d Cir. 1932); Littick, 31 T.C. 181 (1958);
Weil, 22 T.C. 1267 (1954).
" Fiorito, 33 T.C. 440 (1959).
'5 Commissioner v. Bensel, 100 F.2d 639 (3d Cir. 1938), aff'g. 36 B.T.A. 246 (1937).
"Id. The court held that the parties to the agreement, although father and son,
were hostile to each other and thus dealt at arm's length.
11 Baltimore Nat'l Bank v. United States, 136 F. Supp. 642 (D. Md. 1955); but
cf. In re Estate of Bielec, 502 P.2d 12 (Cal. 1972).
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answer." Although the cases discussed herein have involved
real estate only as an asset represented by corporate securities
or a partnership interest, the same principles should apply. 9
Many farmers are engaging in their farming business with
sons and other "natural objects of their bounty" in associations
that are either loosely defined as partnerships, although title
to the property is held in one name only, or that have actually
accomplished true partnership or corporate status under the
law. Since the prerequisite business purpose probably exists,
great benefit can be derived for these persons by the use of buy-
sell agreements. Although not every situation will allow the use
of this arrangement to halt further inflation of farm values for
estate tax purposes, such agreements remain a very valuable
and logical tool in estate planning.
ADDENDUM
Subsequent to the writing of this article, Congress passed
the 1976 Tax Reform Act, which revised Internal Revenue
Code, Section 2032A. This new section goes a long way toward
solving the problem of inflated valuation of farm lands and
closely held business for estate tax purposes, but some limita-
tions remain. Although the limitations are not so onerous as to
render the new provision ineffective, they may, in many cases,
raise problems which could be avoided. The significant disad-
vantage of the new provision over the use of buy-sell agree-
ments, is that although the new act provides for a conservative
valuation method, it is a valuation at death. A buy-sell agree-
ment enables the taxpayer to use the conservative method at
an earlier time and thus eliminate further inflation of that
value.
Treas. Reg. § 20.2031-3 (1958).
4 Estate of Francis J. Moors, No. 99866 (B.T.A., Oct. 22, 1940); P-H B.T.A. Dec.
No. 40,520. In this case the decedent died owning a one-third interest in a summer
home at Cohasset, Mass., which he had acquired in 1915 by purchase from a trust
established under his mother's will. The purchase by the decedent and his two brothers
had been pursuant to an agreement among the five beneficiaries of the trust allowing
the purchase for $60,000 subject to repurchase of any of the three interests upon
death of a brother for a fraction of the $60,000 equal to the fraction owned by the de-
ceased brother. When Francis J. Moors died in 1937, the executors purchased his one-
third interest for $20,000, and included the property in his estate at that value. The
Commissioner revalued the property at $31,966, but the Board of Tax Appeals, finding
that the maximum'price which the estate could receive for the property was $20,000,
held that the valuation could not exceed that figure.
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The second significant development under the new law
results from the amended basis rules of Section 1014. One of
the critical considerations in buy-sell agreements has been the
fact that the estate would have a stepped-up basis equal to the
value determined under the agreement, and therefore, when
the sale pursuant to the agreement took place, the estate would
have no recognized gain. Under the new act, the estate does not
get a stepped-up basis, but rather carries over the basis of the
decedent, adjusted to the fair market value on December 31,
1976. Since this "fresh start" basis rule does not rely on the
actual value on December 31, 1976, but instead prorates any
increase in value over original basis, it would seem to be impos-
sible to assure that the price established in the agreement
would equal "value" on December 31, 1976. Thus, the estate
tax savings occasioned by a reduced valuation pursuant to a
buy-sell agreement, must be off set by the tax on gain that the
estate will realize in the event of the sale pursuant to the agree-
ment. Although prior cases have not considered whether an
actual sale took place, it is predictable that such a sale or some
other recognition of gain might be required in the future in
order to render the valuation contained in the buy-sell agree-
ment as determinative. This means that the estate planner
must take into account the possibility of such a tax on gain in
determining whether a buy-sell agreement will produce an ulti-
mate estate tax savings. One additional factor related to the
foregoing problem is that the taker of the property will have a
benefit in that the basis in his hands will be determined under
Section 1012 rather than under Section 1014 as amended.
Therefore, the possibility of a subsequent sale by the taker of
the property must also be taken into account in evaluating the
desirability of the use of the buy-sell agreement.
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